Blackhawk Down Paper Assignment

[panthersix]

Also, you may want to locate the Army Style Guide for writing US Army documents. When I was a newly minted 2LT a CWO gave me a copy to use. That would probably impress your instructor. Is this an information brief?

[mr02060]

Rangers, I've been busy with school and just got back from family vacation and haven't had a chance to post.
Ranger xray- I have no idea why I was writing in first person, I changed it.
I revised some of the paper, most notably switching the point of view and trying to make my points a little more clear. I received an A on the paper,
Thanks again Rangers

[panthersix]

Rangers, I've been busy with school and just got back from family vacation and haven't had a chance to post.
Ranger xray- I have no idea why I was writing in first person, I changed it.
I revised some of the paper, most notably switching the point of view and trying to make my points a little more clear. I received an A on the paper,
Thanks again Rangers

An "A'" on your paper....you know what that means...

[Jim]

Please post your final submission here.

[panthersix]

Please post your final submission here.

No, it means he has to post a pic of the hottest cadet in his class...

[colt1rgr]

Don't forget the greatest leadership failure of all was when Clinton did not authorize Spectre Gunships and Armor in the first place!

And if it wasn't Clinton, then find out who it was and fry them in your paper! Freakin Armchair Combat Leaders! GRRRRRRRRRR!

This is the biggest failure I know of personally. This OP was planned to be supported by AC-130 support, period! It was assinine to launch minus that support but the boys were given orders and they marched straight ahead. That failure falls directly on the feminine shoulders of Slick Willie! For the record, gunships were authorized but pulled for a higher profile mission in Kosovo (READ - Total PR sham and disregard for the boys!). Willie also denied the Armor support Garrison requested.

[mr02060]

After reading Black Hawk Down, the difficulty of an urban fight on an asymmetrical battlefield became very clear. Fighting in an ancient African city where every road and alley looks like the one before caused unforeseen problems for the soldiers that day in Somalia. These problems hindered rescue efforts by the Rangers and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) led by Lieutenant Colonel Bill David, causing them to take much longer than expected to reach the crash sites. The roadblocks which caused the rescue forces to take different routes then planned, should have been expected. The Somalis had implemented roadblocks in the past and the Americans had seen them on previous missions.

Another problem that day was communication. It was taking too long for convoys to receive directions from command, and when they did, it was confusing.1 Communication continued to be a problem later in the struggle. While trying to make it back to base, Captain Steele and what was left of his men were stranded on National Street.2 At this point Pakistani and Malaysian armored forces had already been in battle to extract the remainder of the American forces. Capt. Steele informed Lt. Col. Gary Harrell that some of his men had been left behind by the Malay driver.3 Lt. Col. Harrell reported back saying, “I thought everybody was loaded,” referring to Lt. Perino and his men.4 However, what Capt. Steele did not know was that the men were in fact picked up. One of the Delta Operators who was with Lt. Perino decided to level off his CAR-15 at the driver, encouraging him to stop and pick up the soldiers.5 Needless to say, the driver decided it was in his best interest to stop and pick up the men.

On June 5th, 1993, four months before the raid in the Bakara Market, twenty-four Pakistani soldiers were slaughtered.6 After the murder of the Pakistani soldiers, Admiral Jonathan Howe “was outraged, and adamant that Aidid be stopped.”7 Howe was responsible for bringing the Rangers to Somalia in order to capture Aidid and try him as a war criminal, and was convinced that by doing so Somalia could be saved.8 The warlord, Farah Aidid, was the reason for the famine that caused thousands of Somalis to starve everyday. Howe proposed to the Pentagon that Delta was needed in June but was denied. This was the first example of leadership failing to recognize the needs of the military in Somalia. Delta should have been allowed to conduct the raid. The United Nations (UN) decided to strike back on July 17th by attacking a house filled with Habr Gidr clan leaders. Admiral Howe was opposed to the idea.9 Howe wanted troops to storm the house and arrest everyone, something that Delta would have been perfect for. The UN did not have adequate soldiers for that type of mission. Again, Delta should have been used but were deemed unnecessary at the time by the U.S. government. The UN instead chose to engage on the house with Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire Command-link (TOW) missiles, attempting to kill everyone inside. The mission was effective in the UN’s eyes, but according to Admiral Howe, the attack made the Somali people choose a side. Somalis opposed to Aidid now rallied behind him.10 The attack was counter-effective and strengthened the Somali resolve, labeling the UN and U.S. as invaders. According to the Somali people, they were at war.

Many things went wrong for Task Force Ranger (TFR) that day. What could go wrong did go wrong. Things started off bad when Private Blackburn fell out of the helicopter moments into the mission.11 Some people would consider what happened on October 3rd, 1993 as a failed mission and one that Americans should forget. It would be unfair and disrespectful to say that eighteen American soldiers and other soldiers from foreign forces lost their lives on a failed mission. Those people who say that do not understand what happened that day and are not qualified to make that assumption. The objective of TFR was to storm a house that held high ranking officials from the Habr Gidr clan and then return to base via a vehicle convoy. This was something that the Operators and Rangers were experts at. This is what they signed up to do and they were confident in their assigned mission. They had no reason to feel otherwise. The operation was completed, successfully transporting the prisoners back to base. The men remained proud of their successful mission, even though some of them did not agree with some of the decisions made prior and during the mission.12

They operation was led by Major General (M.G.) William F. Garrison. M.G. Garrison was completely qualified for the job and for the most part had the support of his men, who “were confident in their tactics and training and committed to their goals.”13 Although the mission itself was a success, it wasn’t without great consequence. There were major decisions to be made prior and during the operation that would cause enormous controversy in the months to come after the battle.

No one can compete with America when it comes to fighting on a conventional battlefield. America has the mightiest military force that this world has ever seen. The commanders of Task Force Ranger knew this. The Somalis knew this. However, this mission wasn’t going to take place on a conventional battlefield. The American commanders knew that there was a possibility of encountering a large oppositional force and they knew that the possibility of being overrun wasn’t probable, but indeed possible. They knew the Somalis had the resources and the numbers to set-up an ambush. It was only a matter of time before an attempt on U.S. forces would be made.

It would be wrong to blame one individual for the events that took place on October 3rd. However, things could have turned out differently if different decisions were made by the Clinton Administration and M.G. Garrison himself. Leadership is being able to prepare those under your control for success. A leader, especially in the military, also needs to be able to know what to do if something should go wrong during a mission. M.G. Garrison was fully capable of making those decisions, but did not correctly prepare for what happened that day in Mogadishu. This is the second example of failed leadership by the U.S. According to Mark Bowden, armored vehicles were never requested for TFR but instead was requested by the QRF of the 10th Mountain Division.14 The request was made by General Montgomery and was rejected. M.G. Garrison notified the QRF about the mission, but let them stay at their base rather than going to the TFR airport base. Then when the QRF was needed it took nearly an hour to reach the TFR airport base.15 Armored vehicles were not the only thing turned down by the U.S. government. AC-130 gunships were also denied by the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. M.G. Garrison himself believed that gunships would do nothing but restrict the use of the Little Birds.16 He believed the AC-130’s would inflict catastrophic damage to the Somalis, killing more innocent people then combatants.17 However, Bowden stated numerous times throughout the book that what seemed to be unarmed civilians were killed. These people, although unarmed, were still dangerous to the Americans. There were mobs of thousands of Somalis trying to get to the crash sites, only to mutilate and parade the bodies of dead soldier’s. The use of the AC-130 could have put a stop to those mobs, more so than the Little Birds. At least it could have slowed them down until reinforcements could arrive.

Additionally, one of the mistakes made by the Clinton Administration came from the decision not to pursue Aidid after the troubled mission of TFR. It makes me wonder if President Clinton personally believed in the mission to begin with. Eighteen American soldiers died, and then the brothers they fought with were asked to pack up and go home. The Rangers and Delta Operators earned the right to complete the mission and avenge the death of their comrades, but the president wouldn’t allow for it. The last line of the Ranger Creed reads, “Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor.”

We were in Somalia initially for the right reasons. We first appeared in Somalia with humanitarian efforts, helping those who were under the lawless rule of Farah Aidid. We provided food and promise to those who were hopeless. It is impossible to say what might have been if Admiral Howe had received Delta in June like he wanted or if M.G. Garrison had ordered the QRF to the TFR base. It is all up to speculation to say that with the armored vehicles and the gunships that American lives would have been saved. Things would not have gotten as bad as they did. America hopefully has learned a lesson from this and will not let something like this happen again. Looking back at the mission of TFR, we should always hope for the best, but always be prepared for the worst.

[KW Driver]

Please post your final submission here.

No, it means he has to post a pic of the hottest cadet in his class...

and he meant chick.

[panthersix]

bump for pic....